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SYMPOSIUM: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
FOR LEGAL DECISIONMAKING
INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIAL
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
Kenneth J. Arrow*
One of the major themes of philosophy in all its branches
since the days of the Greeks has been the conflict of the Many and
the One. Is the natural universe made of many different principles,
as our uniformed senses would tell us, or is there a deep underlying unity, so that there is really only one substance? If the former,
how can the different aspects of reality relate to each other? There
must be something in common for them to interact. But if there is
just one substance, how can we observe apparent differences? In
particular, how can there be any change except from the interaction of differing principles?
Questions such as these are in a fundamental sense unanswerable. Nevertheless, and contrary to the positivist views that dominated most of our thinking until recently, asking these questions is
fruitful. The striving for unity, for the common core of apparently
disparate entities, has been a powerful impulse to our increases of
knowledge; yet it could not itself be justified as an empirical or logical necessity. Occam's razor is a meta-physical principle in the literal sense of the word. Positivism was and is correct in distinguishing between metaphysical questions such as unity versus diversity,
and scientific questions, which are in principle answerable from

* Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research,
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empirical information with the aid of mathematics and logic. But
metaphysical questions have their role in orienting our scientific
discussions.
Nowhere is the opposition of the Many and the One sharper
than in the workings of society. Nothing is more obvious than the
desire of each individual to achieve his or her over peculiar aims;
and, equally, nothing is more obvious than the desirability, nay
need, of individuals to join in societies for their own best achievement. "Man," said Aristotle, "is a social animal," a categorization
which has been made much of in recent years by the sociobiologists. 1
The gains from social interaction are obvious enough. The
parent-child relation is the most striking example: The dependency
of the human child on its parents is an extreme among animals. Evolutionary fitness requires that the gain to the child be matched by
an imputed gain to the parents; their utility functions, to use the
economists' jargon, must have an altruistic component. Human beings are different from each other, and therefore in Ricardian fashion they gain by trade from their differing comparative advantages.
In a society, even similar individuals can specialize in different activities and acquire different abilities-the division of labor Adam
Smith emphasized. Beyond these market examples is the whole
range of externalities. At their deepest level, these go far beyond
the economists' substitutes for the market: cost-benefit analysis,
simulated markets, and the like. The whole network of courtesies
and respect, the internalized inhibitions which, far more than the
criminal law, keep crime at levels which are tolerable if not pleasant, the customs and sanctions which prevent excessive lying and
deceit-and so preserve to some extent the value of the spoken
and written word-are all parts of the social world in which individual behavior is embedded.
The legal system obviously is an important example of the control of individual behavior in the interests of a collectivity. It
consists of a set of incentives, both rewards and penalties, to induce alteration of individual behavior. The legal system is itself a
social entity, and its aims are the better achievement of social
ends.
Much modern thought has revolved about the decision or
choice as the key concept in the analysis of behavior, individual or

1. See, e.g., E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 1547-74 (1975).
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social. 2 The individual or the society is thought of as having a
range of alternative possible actions from which one must be selected. 3 The individual can commit a crime or refrain from
committing one; an agency of the collective, such as a court, can
punish or not. Also, while some decisions relate to a single moment (this crime, this ice cream cone), others may be decisions or
rules which are to hold in a large number of similar circumstances,
for example, legislation or binding judicial decisions.
The hedonistic psychology essential to Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism has dominated modern economic analysis, especially in
the form of neoclassical and Austrian economic thinking, as originated by W. Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and L6on Walras between 1871 and 1874. 4 In this doctrine, the act of choice becomes
entwined with evaluation and judgment. What is chosen must have
been preferred; and what is preferred must be in some sense better. These simple remarks have given rise to a vast literature on
the structure of decision and value, both individual and social, and
on their relations. Though we have been taught to distinguish
sharply between the "is" and the "ought," the logical analysis of

decisions tends to blur the lines between them. The distinction
can, and in my judgment should be kept, but it requires great clarity of thought to do so. Needless to say, matters are not made
easier by the analyst's being also a human being who is being analyzed.
Let me be more specific about the structural requirements on
behavior implicit in the languages of preference and choice. First,
the very fact of choice implies decisiveness. Given a set of
alternatives, something must be chosen. We may, for convenience,

admit the possibility of indifference-that we would not care which
of several alternatives are chosen-but we cannot admit noncomparability of alternatives. Second, the language of preference

2. For a survey of individual choice theory, see P. FISHBURN, UTILITY THEORY
FOR DECISION MAKING (1970). For the historical background of modem social
choice theory, see D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 156-213

(1958); Arrow, Formal Theories of Social Welfare, in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 276 (P. Wiener ed. 1973).

3.

For my exposition of social choice theory, see K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE

AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); Arrow, Values and Collective DecisionMaking, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 215 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds.

1967).
4. W. JEVONS, THE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (H. Higgs ed. 1905); C.
MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (J. Dingwall & B. Hoselitz trans. 1950); L.
WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (W. Jaff6 ed. and trans. 1954).
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usually conveys the idea of an ordering: If one alternative is
preferred to a second and that to a third, then the first alternative
should be preferred to the third. More technically, this last property is known as transitivity.
If we now identify choice with preference, we are saying
something like the following: One alternative is preferred to another if the first would be chosen were only those two available.
(As in virtually all scientific generalizations, it is impossible to confine oneself to actual phenomena; it is necessary also to make
counterfactual statements, about what would happen if some conditions were to prevail, even if they do not. The law of gravitation
tells us what would happen in solar systems different from our
own.) Hence, we have the following standard description of individual choice behavior: All possible alternatives are ordered, in the
sense that any two alternatives are comparable, and the preferred
choices satisfy the transitivity condition; then the choice made from
any given set of alternatives is the most preferred, i.e., that one
which is preferred to all other available alternatives.
There are of course many more things to be said about individual choice behavior. Some psychologists will object that the description in terms of orderings is unrealistic and unduly restrictive. 5
Other psychologists will join older schools of economists and many
philosophers to argue that even more can be said; not only can
choices be ordered but the intensities of preferences can be measured. 6 The measurement of preference intensity, if it is accepted as
meaningful, is called utility, and the hypothesis of its meaningful
measurability is termed cardinalutility.
The crucial link between individual and social action is the
presence of what may be termed a social mechanism. This can be
described by specifying two types of elements: (1) a range of actions available to each individual; and (2) a social outcome defined
for each possible choice of actions by all individuals. The individual
"actions" may and frequently are "signals" or messages,
acts of
communication. 7 Thus, in a legal system, the individual actions may
5. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
6. See generally C. CooMBs, A THEORY OF DATA (1964); Stevens, The Psychophysics of Sensory Function, 48 AM. ScI. 226 (1960).
7. For a general study of social decision processes as the outcomes of communication, see Hurwicz, Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes, in MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1959, at 27-46
(K. Arrow, S. Karlin, & P. Suppes eds. 1960).
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be thought of broadly as all the activities which are of legal significance, such as signing contracts or engaging in activities which may
lead to torts, and more specifically as the messages of the legal system, filing suits, assembling evidence, or seeking injunctions. The
social outcome would be broadly the changes in performance as a
result of contracts and damages and specifically the judgments of
the legal system in suits as a function of the court actions taken.
The outcome might indeed have a random or unpredictable component even given the actions of all individuals.
Indeed, what I have called a social mechanism is nothing else
than a game in the terminology introduced by John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern. 8 It defines in an appropriate way the relation between individual behavior (the actions taken by individuals)
and social behavior (the social outcomes). Society and the individual enter jointly in the definition. Given the social mechanism, the
social outcome is determined by individual actions. But the very
range of individual actions as well as the outcome appropriate to
any set of individual actions are determined by the social mechanism.
For a given social mechanism, individual behavior can be
thought of as determined by individual preferences. That is, the individual chooses that action which he or she most prefers. In the
context of a game or social mechanism, this is not a straightforward
decision. Individuals have preferences over outcomes (e.g., court
decisions) and not over their actions as such; and whether a given
action leads to a more or less desirable outcome may depend on
what other individuals do. This possibility is likely to arise if the
social outcomes have two or more components. Suppose, for example, there are two connected highways being considered for construction. The social mechanism requires separate voting on them.
Individuals will have different preferences about each of them.
Some will want both but not either segment separately. This group
will vote for both if they think there are enough others voting for
each segment separately to make both pass. If, however, there is a
majority for one of the segments but not for the other, the group
that wants both would prefer to vote against both.
The problem of interaction among issues is a basic one in reality. It raises in a deep way the meaning of rational individual behavior in a social context. Much of the modem literature on game
8. See generally J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
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theory is essentially a series of attempts to answer this question.
Consider two prototypes of social or collective choice which
have been influential in fixing our ideas: competitive economic
equilibrium and elections. In the competitive framework, there is
an illusion that social choice disappears completely. Each individual's property is disposed of as he or she will. But the terms on
which the exchange takes place, the prices, are in fact the joint result of the supply and demand pressures of all the participants in
the economy. The prices are not any sets of numbers but just those
causing supply and demand to balance. Hence, they are, if through
indirect means, jointly determined by all individuals in the market.
The information or messages sent by the participants are the
amounts that they are willing to pay and receive at each of various
prices for each commodity; the competitive equilibrium in effect
aggregates this information and yields a resultant allocation of
goods.
Hence, competitive economic equilibrium is a social mechanism. It does have some interesting properties: (1) It requires the
transmission of very little information (not as little as frequently
supposed, but relatively little); (2) the self-interest of individuals is
uncomplicated (they simply demand or supply their most preferred
set of goods at the going prices); and (3) under certain conditions,
most particularly the absence of externalities, the resulting allocation is efficient in the sense of Pareto (there is no other allocation
which will make everyone better off). These are desiderata for any
social mechanism.
Election is in some ways the prototypical social mechanism.
The actions or messages of individuals are the votes (which may be
simple or complicated in nature); the outcome is the determination
of the winner, according to the electoral rules. If there are but two
candidates, then the principle of majority rule has a straightforward
meaning: Each voter chooses one or the other candidate, and the
candidate with more votes wins. When there are more than two
candidates, there are in principle many forms of voting which have
the same spirit as majority rule. The preferences of the individuals
are over the entire set of candidates, thus, not only first choices
but also second, third, and so forth. Most election systems used in
practice depend only on the first choices, as in the usual plurality
system; however, the French presidential and legislative elections
use a plurality followed by a runoff between the two leading candidates if there is no majority on the first ballot-a procedure implicitly using preferences beyond first choice. Many other systems are
theoretically possible. They will usually have in part the same
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properties as those stated above for competitive equilibria: (1) Very
little information need be transmitted, though, with more complicated electoral schemes, perhaps a bit more of the preference ordering than in the competitive equilibria; (2) there are incentives
to misrepresent one's two preferences, especially not to throw
away one's vote on a clearly losing candidate; (3) the outcome is
bound to be Pareto optimal, though here, even more than in the
case of competitive equilibrium, the criterion of Pareto efficiency is
not very strong.
There has been an interesting literature, with some applications, on the predictive theory of elections.9 In this, the candidates
appear as embodiments of sets of issues chosen by them in order to
maximize votes; in short, they are political entrepreneurs analogous
to those of the economy.
So far, we have taken social mechanisms as given. The interests of classical political philosophers and modem social choice
theorists alike have been concentrated on the design of social
mechanisms. Any design problem involves an idea of the good.
Specifically, the "good" in this context denotes "socially good."
As I have suggested earlier, once we start with the idea of individual preference, it is natural to identify the good with the satisfaction of individual preferences. Some philosophers have rejected
such an approach on the grounds that individuals do not know what
is good for them. But most would accept this, subject to obvious
qualifications for those deemed incompetent, including children.
State intervention to protect individuals is indeed frequently
referred to as "paternalism." A minimal expression of the acceptance of individual preferences is the Pareto principle.
But when the social mechanism has implications for distributive justice, stronger concepts of respect for individual preferences
are sometimes called for. If one accepts the notion of cardinal utility and the further proposition that the utilities of different individuals are comparable (we can make statements of the form, "this
hurts me more than it hurts you"), then the utilitarian logic becomes very acceptable: Choose that social alternative which makes
the sum of individual's utilities as large as possible. This concept
has had great intellectual sway, in both economics and law, and has
also aroused violent opposition.10
9. For a survey of this literature, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 263-70
(1979).
10. For defenses and uses of utilitarianism in economics, see F. EDGEVORTH,
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS (1881); A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL (1944);
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One difficulty with utilitarianism is that it contradicts minimal
information transfer: a criterion that we found satisfied in both
competitive equilibria and elections. In both of these social mechanisms, we need only transmit knowledge about preferences, not
about cardinal utilities. Indeed the very difficulty in seeing how
such information could be transmitted has led social choice theorists to emphasize voting methods.
There is one final consideration on the nature of the outcomes
generated by the social mechanism: They can be described as
yielding a social choice among alternatives. It is tempting to add
that these outcomes can be interpreted as expressions of social
preference, just as individual choices are thought of as expressions
of individual preference. In that case, the choices of outcomes from
different sets of alternatives should be consistent with each other,
for example, satisfying the transitivity condition. It is as if the collectivity has a degree of rationality (in the sense of consistency
among choices) comparable to that of an individual.
Most systematic social thinking has followed this line. The utilitarian criterion meets the condition of collective rationality; so
does the difference principle of John Rawls (to make the worst-off
individual as well off as possible). 1 ' In general, collective rationality
implies that the social mechanism should be chosen so as to
maximize some function based, one way or the other, on individual
preferences. It turns out that this program is difficult to achieve, at
least with limited transmission of information about intensities of
utility. Nevertheless, the exploration of these possibilities has been
immensely illuminating.
The questions (not answers) raised by the social choice approach have been applied only in limited degree to the field of
law. I hope the following articles will begin such an exploration.

Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, 30 ECON. J. 348 (1920). For
an attack on utilitarianism as insufficiently egalitarian, see A. SEN, ON ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY (1973). By implication, those opposed to any use of the tax system to
achieve egalitarianism are also anti-utilitarian, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND

FREEDOM 172-76 (1962). In the law, the utilitarian logic was used by the developer
of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham; for a more recent use of this method, see R.
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1961). For a strong attack, see R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232-38 (1977).
11. J. BAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-75 (1971).
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